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The Beirut Agreement: A License to

Censor?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Beirut Agreement' is a multilateral treaty intended to facilitate international circulation of certain audiovisual materials. 2 To ac3
complish this goal, the Agreement authorizes participating countries
to issue certificates to films determined to be of an "educational, scientific and cultural character."' 4 When presented to importing coun1. Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory
Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, opened for signature July 15,
1949, 17 U.S.T. 1580, T.I.A.S. No. 6116 [hereinafter cited as the Beirut Agreement].
2. World-Wide Free Flow of (Export-Import) Audio-Visual Materials, 22 C.F.R. Pt.
502, § 502.7(b) (1984).
3. Current signatories to the Agreement are:
United States of America
Lebanon
Brazil
Libya
Canada
Madagascar
Costa Rica
Malawi
Cuba
Malta
Cyprus
Morocco
Denmark
Niger
El Salvador
Norway
Ghana
Pakistan
Greece
Philippines
Haiti
People's Republic of
Iran
the Congo
Iraq
Syria
Jordan
Trinidad and Tobago
Khmer Republic
Yugoslavia
22 C.F.R. § 502.7(e)(1) (1984).
In addition, the following countries routinely honor certificates on an informal basis:
Afghanistan
Netherlands
Belgium
New Zealand
Bermuda
Nicaragua
Dominican Republic
Nigeria
Equador
Panama
Finland
Peru
France
Rhodesia IZimbabwe]
Gibraltar
Spain
Guatemala
Sri Lanka
Guyana
Suriname
India
Sweden
Ireland
United Kingdom
Kuwait
Uruguay
Liberia
People of Taiwan
Id. § 502.7(e)(2).
4. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § 2, and art. I.
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tries, these certificates exempt the films which they accompany from
import duties aimed primarily at money-making, blockbuster motion
pictures. 5 Certified films also escape any limits on the number of
prints that can be imported and the need to apply for import licenses,
6
thereby saving their distributors a great deal of time and paperwork.
Certificates are particularly advantageous, if not essential, to distributors of educational or documentary films because the import duties which would otherwise be imposed on such films can be
prohibitively high.7 And, even if these import duties do not make
foreign distribution altogether too costly, they still represent additional handling costs which discourage overseas distributors from
buying or renting films that are not certified. 8 Thus, decisions to issue
certificates authorized under the Beirut Agreement can significantly
enhance the ability of film distributors to exhibit documentary or educational films abroad. 9
In the United States, the United States Information Agency
(USIA) administers this certification program,' 0 and under its direction, the program has reached significant proportions." From its in5. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1984, at B8, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Comments of John
Mendenhall]; Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. III, § 1. The Agreement, however, does not
exempt films from fees or charges which are imposed on all imported goods, irrespective of
their nature or origin. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. III, § 2.
6. Comments of John Mendenhall, supra note 5. Exemption from the need to apply for
an import license, however, does not guarantee that the importing country will accept the film,
since Article V of the Agreement preserves the right of each country to ban material under its
own censorship laws. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. V.
7. Foreign import duties on a documentary film, for example, can run as high as 100%
of the film's cost, and an import duty of $50,000 per print is not unheard of. Rosenberg, For
Our Eyes Only, AMERICAN FILM, July-Aug. 1983, at 40, 41; Comments of John Mendenhall,
supra note 5.
8. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 42.
9. It is evident from its terms that the Beirut Agreement gives the country from which a
film originates considerable power to shield a film from another country's import duties and
restrictions. As a matter of state sovereignty, however, the final decision to impose or not to
impose those duties or restrictions formally rests with the receiving government under Article
IV of the Agreement. See Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § 6; telephone interview
with Sally Lawrence, Attestation Officer (Mar. 8, 1985). That government, however, must
give "due consideration" to the certifying country's judgment. Beirut Agreement, supra note
1, art. IV, § 6.
10. Exec. Order No. 11,311, 22 C.F.R. § 636 (1984), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. 2051 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 11,311].
11. The certification program is administered from a staff of 3,400, USIA Fact Sheet,
July 1, 1983, at 2 (available from the Office of Congressional and Public Liaison, United States
Information Agency, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20547) [hereinafter
cited as USIA Fact Sheet], and, in 1985, will share a budget of approximately $850 million with
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ception in 1966 through 1982, the USIA certified over 36,000 films. 12
During 1982 alone, it certified nearly 2,000 films for duty-free importation g abroad.' 3 Because the United States produces and exports
more educational films than all other countries combined,14 the Beirut
Agreement has probably benefited the American documentary and
educational film industry most.
Nonetheless, the fact that the USIA also rejects twenty-five to
thirty films each year' 5 has spawned recent criticism. Specifically,
some commentators have suggested that the USIA has imposed unnecessarily restrictive eligibility requirements which infringe upon
film distributors' first amendment rights.' 6 This Comment explores
the legal issues raised by this criticism.
First, however, the USIA's certification process, including its legislative history and administrative guidelines, will be discussed in Part
II. Concerns that the USIA's regulations and actions have been inconsistent with congressional intent; that the statutes creating the certification program and the USIA's regulations unconstitutionally
inhibit expression; and that the entire process violates the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
will then be addressed in Part III. Finally, in Part IV, a suggestion
for assuaging criticism of the program will be presented.
II.

THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

A.

HistoricalBackground

On September 13, 1949, at the third meeting of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
held in Beirut, Lebanon, twenty-one countries,' 7 including the United
States, signed an agreement to facilitate the international circulation
other departments of the USIA. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 1985 at

8-185.
12. USIA Summary Report on Activity, Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1982 (available from the Office
of Public Liaison, United States Information Agency, Washington, D.C. 20547).
13. Id.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 1780, 89th Cong.. 2d Sess., reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3143, 3143-45. The vast majority of these films go to Canada. Telephone interview

with Sally Lawrence, Attestation Officer (Mar. 8, 1985).
15. Comments of John Mendenhall, supra note 5, at col. 3.
16. Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 22; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 40-43; Sobel, Rated PP (for "PoliticalPropaganda")by Uncle Sam's Movie Critics: FederalRegulations Concerning the Import and Export
of Films That May "Influence" Public Opinion, 5 ENTERTAINMENT L. REP. 1, 3 (Jan. 1984).
17. See supra note 3.
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of certain audio-visual materials.' 8 Specifically, under this treaty,
known as the Beirut Agreement, signatories agreed to exempt audiovisual materials that are of an "educational, scientific and cultural
character"' 9 from nearly all import duties and restrictions. 20 On October 8, 1966, after fifteen years during which the United States issued
certificates on an informal basis, Congress authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to designate a federal agency to administer the terms
of the Agreement. 21 President Johnson assigned this task to the International Communication Agency, 22 currently known as the United
23
States Information Agency.
The USIA was the logical and natural recepticle of this program
since the Agency was originally established expressly to provide other
countries with information about American society.24 To accomplish
this broad goal, the USIA conducts international communication, educational, cultural and exchange programs. 25 Its policies are guided
by the executive branch, and its director reports to the President and
the Secretary of State.2 6 The USIA is staffed by 3,400 people in the
United States, most of whom are in Washington, D.C. In addition,
the USIA employs approximately 4,300 people stationed throughout
127 foreign countries. 27
Through foreign press centers, speakers, publications and exchange activities, the USIA generally strives to project an "accurate
and positive image of the United States and its foreign policy
abroad. ' ' 28 The Agency devotes the most resources to Voice of
America, which is broadcast in forty-two languages throughout the
18. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1.
19. Id. art. I.
20. Id. art. III, § 1.
21. H.R.J. Res. 688, 89th Cong. 2d Sess., 112 Cong. Rec. 22, 207-08 (1966) (hereinafter
cited as Resolution 688].
22. Exec. Order No. 11,311, supra note 10.
23. Redesignation of International Communication Agency as United States Information
Agency, 96 Stat. 291 (1982), 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1983). The United States International Communication Agency was retitled the United States Information Agency and given its present
structure as a result of President Carter's Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, 91 Stat.

1636, 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1983).
24. President's Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977,
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4724, reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1983) [hereinafter

cited as President's Message].
25.

APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 1985 at I-

Y99 [hereinafter cited as Appendix to Budget].
26. See President's Message, supra note 24.
27. USIA Fact Sheet, supra note 11, at 2.
28. Id. at 5.
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world, is the USIA's main instrument, and is the "centerpiece" of the
current effort to counter the "large and growing . . . Soviet disinformation campaign."' 29 Other programs include "Project Truth,"
under which the USIA publishes a monthly "Soviet propaganda
alert" and provides a cable service also to refute Soviet disinformation
overseas. 30 Additionally, the USIA produces a news feature service
for use abroad, 3' and the USIA publishes ten magazines and several
commercial bulletins that contain reprinted articles from Amercian
periodicals. 32 Many foreign exchange programs, including the Fulbright Scholarship, the Humphrey Fellowship and several private sec33
tor exchange programs, come under the USIA's direction as well.
Further, the "Arts America" program allows the USIA to select cer34
tain groups of performers and art exhibitions for viewing abroad.
Finally, of course, the USIA administers the terms of the Beirut
35
Agreement, under its television and film service.
B.

Procedurefor Obtaininga Certificate

As directed by Congress and the President, 36 and in accordance
with the Beirut Agreement, 37 the USIA has drawn up an orderly procedure for obtaining a certificate. 38 In the United States, a person or
entity who holds "basic rights" in a film, generally the owner, must
complete and return a preprinted USIA application and, if feasible,
accompany it with a copy of his material. 39 The applicant is asked,
among other things, to summarize his film's content and state its intended audience. 40 Based upon this application, the USIA's Chief At29. MAJOR THEMES AND ADDmONAL BUDGET DETAILS FY 1985 at 518, 519.
30. USIA Fact Sheet, supra note 11, at 5.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Appendix to Budget, supra note 25.
34. USIA Fact Sheet, supra note 11, at 8. While film industry observers have questioned
the USIA's certification procedure, members of the art community have complained that the
USIA uses overly restrictive, excessively patriotic criteria in selecting art exhibits it considers
suitable for viewing abroad. See Madoff, Sending US Art Abroad: Federal Ways and Means,
ART IN AMERICA, Sept. 1982, at 10.
35. 22 C.F.R. § 502.1.
36. See Resolution 688, supra note 21 and text accompanying notes 21 and 22; Exec.
Order No. 11,311, supra note 10.
37. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § 6.
38. 22 C.F.R. § 502.3.
39. Id. § 502.3(a), (g)(l), (3).
40. USIA Application for Certificate of International Educational Character (approved
through June 1985) (available from the Office of Congressional and Public Liaison, United
States Information Agency, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20547).
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testation Officer and his staff then begin their determination of
4
whether the film should be granted a certificate. 1
In reviewing a film, USIA officials regularly consult with a group
of advisors who comprise the Interdepartmental Committee on Visual
and Auditory Materials for Distribution Abroad. 42 These advisors
represent a broad spectrum of governmental agencies, including the
executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, and the United
States Postal Service, General Services Administration, Veterans' Administration, Library of Congress, NASA, National Gallery of Art,
and the National Science Foundation. 4 3 In addition to the members
of this committee, the USIA consults with "experts" from both government and the private sector to determine whether a film's content
is "educational, scientific, and cultural" and therefore entitled to certification. 44 For example, the USIA consulted officials from the Department of Defense to determine whether a film addressing the
45
difficulties facing female army recruits should receive a certificate.
Similarly, the USIA consulted officials at the Environmental Protection Agency to decide whether a film dealing with nuclear waste
should be given a certificate. 46 Based upon its independent judgment,
and in consultation with advisors or experts when needed, the USIA
will grant a film a certificate if the Agency considers it eligible under
the Beirut Agreement as interpreted in the USIA's regulations.
C. Eligibilityfor Certification
1. Eligibility under the Beirut Agreement
Under the Beirut Agreement, only films of an "educational, sci47
entific and cultural character" are eligible to receive certificates.
The Beirut Agreement contains three broad guidelines for determining whether a film meets these criteria. First, the country from which
the film originates must determine that the film's "primary purpose or
effect is to instruct or inform through development of a subject or
aspect of a subject, or [that the film's] content [will] maintain, in41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

22 C.F.R. § 502.4(a).
Id. § 502.4(b).
Id.
Id. § 502.4(a).
Comments of John Mendenhall, supra note 5, at col. 2; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at

46.

Comments of John Mendenhall, supra note 5, at col. 2; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at

47.

Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § 2.

42.
41.
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crease or diffuse knowledge, and augment international understanding
....

48

Second, the country of origin must find the film "represen-

tative, authentic and accurate."' 49 Finally, there must be an assurance
that the technical quality of the film will not interfere with its use. 50
2.

Eligibility under USIA regulations

The USIA's regulations governing the issuance of certificates incorporate the guidelines set forth in the Beirut Agreement. 5 These
regulations, however, expand upon the Agreement to give specific examples of material that will not be deemed appropriate for certification. 52 For example, the USIA will not certify material primarily
intended to amuse or entertain. 53 Likewise, it will not certify material
which is primarily intended to inform viewers about timely current
events, including newsreels or newscasts. 54 Nor will the USIA certify
most kinds of material aimed at influencing opinion, conviction, or
policy, espousing a cause, or attacking a particular persuasion or belief.55 Furthermore, it will not certify "material which may lend itself
to misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the United States or
other countries . . . or which appear[s] . . . to attack or discredit

-56
economic, religious or political views ....
In short, the USIA will issue certificates only to material which it
views as uncontroversial and which the USIA believes participating
countries would be willing to admit duty-free. 57 This apparently restrictive view 58 of the guidelines set forth in the Beirut Agreement is
at the root of criticism of the USIA's procedure.
III.

A.

CRITICISM OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

The USIA's Interpretationof the Beirut Agreement

It has been suggested that USIA officials exercise too much dis48.

Id. art. I(a).

49.

Id. art. I(b).

50. Id. art. I(c).
51.

22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1984).

52. Id. § 502.6(b).
53. Id § 502.6(b)(1).
54.

Id. § 502.6(b)(2).

55.

Id § 502.6(b)(3).

56. Id. § 502.6(b)(5).
57. Id. § 502.6(d)(2).
58. See Sobel, supra note 16, at 9 ("Apparently, the USIA's conservative regulations are
intended to assure that USIA certifications are rarely if ever rejected by foreign
governments.").
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cretion in deciding whether to issue a film a certificate. 59 Specifically,
in American Film, the publication of the American Film Institute located in Washington, D.C., one writer suggested that the USIA bases
its decision upon criteria which are unnecessarily more restrictive
than the criteria found in the Beirut Agreement itself and implicitly
adopted by Congress when it enacted the Agreement. 6° To illustrate
this point, the writer commented that the USIA's policy against certifying films primarily intended to amuse or entertain, for example, is
authorized neither by the terms of the Beirut Agreement, nor by the
legislative act or executive order empowering the USIA to implement
the Agreement. 6 1 Rather, he argues, this policy appears to be predicated solely upon agency regulations that extend far beyond the terms
of the Agreement and the laws which empowered the USIA to issue
certificates. 62 This observation suggests that the USIA may have unconstitutionally exceeded its administrative authority by writing regulations which are inconsisitent with Congress' intent.
Under elementary principles of administrative law, an administrative agency cannot adopt regulations which do not reflect the intent of Congress as expressed in legislation empowering the agency to
perform its task. 63 Thus, administrative regulations cannot, for example, "require more than the statute under which they were promulgated." 64 Regulations which violate these principles are considered
void. 6 5 Accordingly, if regulations drafted by the USIA deny certificates to films which would nonetheless be eligible under federal legislation, then those regulations apparently misrepresent Congress'
intent and are therefore void.
In delegating to the USIA the power to issue certificates under
the Beirut Agreement, federal legislators intended that United States
participation in the certification program would "promote [a] better
understanding of the United States in other countries and would increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States
and those of other nations."' 66 To help accomplish this goal, Congress
envisioned that the certification program would "have the effect of
59.

Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 41.

60. Id.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965).
Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Dixon, 381 U.S. at 74.
Resolution 688, supra note 21, at 2.

1985]

Beirut Agreement

increasing the institutional use abroad of certified American educational films ....",67 Consequently, Congress simply incorporated and
did not attempt to restrict or more precisely define the eligibility
guidelines set forth in the Beirut Agreement. 68 Four USIA regulations
"interpreting" the Beirut Agreement, however, do appear to restrict
these guidelines.
1. Films which address timely current events
According to section 502.6(b)(2) of the Agency's regulations, the
USIA does not consider material intended to "inform concerning
timely current events (newsreels, newscasts, other forms of 'spot
news')" to be of an educational, scientific and cultural character and,
therefore, eligible for certification. 69 Neither legislation directing the
USIA to implement the Beirut Agreement, nor the treaty itself, however, appear to support this interpretation. One might reasonably conclude that films informing viewers about current controversies might
"promote [a] better understanding of the United States" among foreign viewers. Similarly, such films could come within the guidelines
of the Beirut Agreement since it is presumably intended to "inform
through the development of a subject . . . ." Additionally, one
would think such films would "increase. . .knowledge, and augment
international understanding in satisfaction of the Beirut Agreement's
requirements. Thus, neither federal legislation nor the Beirut Agreement appears to require the USIA's refusal to certify films which inform viewers of timely current events.
2.

Films which attempt to influence opinion

The Agency also does not consider films which "attempt to influence opinion, conviction or policy (religious, economic or political
propaganda), [which] espouse a cause, or. . .[which] seem to attack
a particular persuasion" to be of an educational, scientific and cul67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(2) (1984). Paradoxically, the USIA also apparently does not
consider films which are "'mainly of historicalinterest' " to be of an educational, scientific and
cultural character. According to American Film, a 1979 documentary which explored the
problems of toxic waste disposal in the United States did not receive a certificate after the
USIA, in consultation with experts at the Environmental Protection Agency, concluded the
film was " 'mainly of historical interest' " since the United States "has made great progress in
managing hazardous wastes." Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 41; Coments of John Mendenhall,
supra note 5, at col. 2.
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tural charactor under section 502.6(b)(3) of its regulations. 70 As an
illustration of this policy, according to American Film, the USIA refused to issue a certificate to a 1981 film on the hazards of uranium
mining and milling operations after experts at the Department of Energy found "'the primary purpose or effect of the film [was] less to
instruct or inform in an educational sense than to present a special

point of view.'

"71

Consistent with Congress' expressed intent, however, opinionated films that espouse a particular cause or present a special point of
view could also "promote [a] better understanding of the United
States" among foreign viewers. On the other hand, section 1 of Article I in the Beirut Agreement conspicuously omits material that is
opinionated from its description of one type of eligible material.
Specifically, the description of material which "maintain[s], increase[s] or diffuse[s] knowledge," 72 appears to be intended to exclude
material aimed at "changing" knowledge, that is, persuasive or opinionated material. In another provision, however, the Agreement specifically declares that material which is intended to inform viewers is
eligible for certification. 73 This latter rubric of eligible material would
seem to include almost any material, including opinionated films
which are specifically denied certificates under section 502.6(b)(3) of
the USIA's regulations. However, given the apparently deliberate absence of opinionated material from section 1 of the Beirut Agreement,
the USIA's practice of denying such films certificates appears to be
justified.
3.

Films which criticize economic, religious, or political views

Under section 502.6(b)(5) of its regulations, the USIA does not
consider films which "attack or discredit economic, religious, or polit74
ical views" to be of an educational, scientific and cultural character.
Films of this type, however, appear to be eligible to receive certificates
under guidelines of the Beirut Agreement since their purpose also can
be to inform. Likewise, one would think that certifying such films
would be consistent with Congress' intent to promote a better understanding of the United States among foreign viewers. Hence, the
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(3).
Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 40.
Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, art. I.
Id.
22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(5) (1984).
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USIA's refusal to certify films which criticize economic, religious or
political views does not appear to be required by federal legislation.
4.

Films which are intended to amuse or entertain

In its effort to segregate blockbuster motion pictures from educational films, the type of material with respect to which the Beirut
Agreement was conceived, the USIA refuses to certify films whose
"primary purpose or effect. . . is to amuse or entertain," under section 502.6(b)(1) of its regulations. 75 Some entertaining films might
enhance foreign viewers' understanding of the United States, consistent with Congressional intent. Likewise, such films are not necessarily opinionated or uninformative, qualities which would render them
ineligible under the guidelines of the Beiruit Agreement. Thus,
although such films might be primarily entertaining, they may still be
entitled to certification under federal legislation.
While these examples do not exhaust the types of films the USIA
will not certify, 76 they apparently represent the regulations under
which most films are disqualified. 77 As demonstrated, several of these
regulations appear to impose requirements neither contemplated by
Congress in delegating to the USIA the authority to administer the
certification process, nor required under the guidelines set forth in the
Beirut Agreement and adopted by Congress. Consequently, they appear to be void.
B. The First Amendment
As described in Part I, a certificate issued by the USIA exempts
the certified film from certain quantitative restrictions, the need to
apply for an import license, and, most importantly, foreign import
duties. 78 Since import duties on films are generally steep and sometimes prohibitively high, the USIA's decision to issue a certificate can
significantly enhance a distributor's ability to exhibit his film
abroad. 79 Therefore, the certification procedure can have a considera75. Id. § 502.6(b)(1).
76. The USIA also does not certify films whose "purpose or effect... is to stimulate the
use of a special process or products to advertise a particular organization or individual, or to
raise funds." Id. § 502.6(b)(4). Nor does the Agency certify films "which may lend [themselves] to misrepresentation of the United States or other countries, their peoples or institutions, or which appear to have as their purpose or effect to attack or discredit economic,
religious, or political views or practices." Id. § 502.6(b)(5).
77. See Rosenberg, supra note 7.
78. See supra notes 5 through 9 and accompanying text.
79. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 42; Comments of Mendenhall, supra note 5, at col. 1.
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ble impact on film distributors' first amendment rights.
Since 1952, films have been a form of speech protected under the
first amendment.80 Concurrently, the Supreme Court has held that
people in the United States have a right, under the first amendment,
to disseminate information irrespective of their intended recipients'
right to receive it.81 It therefore follows that film distributors have a
first amendment right to send films abroad irrespective of the fact that
foreign viewers may not have a first amendment right to view them.
Consequently, the USIA's certification process raises the issue of
whether, under the first amendment, the USIA can constitutionally
deny film distributors certificates based upon the criteria set forth in
8 2
the USIA's regulations.
Although the USIA's certification process has not been challenged in court, a similar film review process administered by the Justice Department has been challenged. In Keene v. Smith,83 California
State Senator Barry Keene, as a would-be film exhibitor, sought to
enjoin the Justice Department from screening incoming foreign films
and classifying them as "political propaganda" as authorized by the
Foreign Agents Registration Act.
Under this Act, registered foreign agents are prohibited from disseminating "political propaganda" in the United States unless the material is actually affixed with a label stating, among other things, that
the person "transmitting" the propaganda is a registered foreign
agent.8 4 The Act defines "political propaganda" as any " 'visual...
expression . . .which is reasonably intend[ed] to . . . indoctrinate,
convert . . . or . . . influence [someone] in the United States with
reference to the political or public interests . . . of a foreign country
. . .or [intended to] promote in the United States racial, religious, or
80. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
81. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974) (prison inmates were entitled to receive uncensored mail since, irrespective of the status of the prisoners' first amendment rights, the senders enjoyed full first amendment protection); see also T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

94 (1967).

82. One commentator has correctly noted that the failure to obtain a certificate technically does not bar a distributor from sending a film abroad; a certificate just makes it easier for
him to do so. Sobel, supra note 16, at 9. This fact, however, does not make the USIA incapable of violating the first amendment rights of film distributors-along with the equal protection
clause. See infra Part III, section c; FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984)
(federal government violated the first amendment rights of a broadcaster by conditioning the
availability of federal funds on the broadcaster's willingness to refrain from editorializing); see
also infra notes 100-02, and accompanying text.
83. 569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
84. Id. at 1516.

1985]

Beirut Agreement

social dissensions . ..

.' "

In addition, the Act gives the Justice De-

partment the responsibility of determining which foreign films fall
within this definition and therefore must display a label.8 5
Senator Keene alleged that by classifying several Canadian films
about nuclear war and environmental hazards as political propaganda, the Justice Department violated his first amendment rights by
deterring him from showing the film and denigrating his reputation.8 6
Applying the Ninth Circuit's test for granting a preliminary injunction,8 7 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California enjoined the Justice Department based upon its finding that
Keene had raised serious questions warranting litigation and had
demonstrated the balance of hardships was significantly in his favor.88
Specifically, the court found "the [Registration Act] unambiguously implicate[d] freedom of speech ....
,,89 In addition, "by focusing on materials that address issues of public policy, the [Act was]
content-sensitive; content-sensitive statutes have long been held to
present the most significant threat to First Amendment rights." 90 Finally, "by focusing on materials that address public policy issues, the
statute appl[ied] to those materials whose protection is the central
concern of the First Amendment." 91 Consequently, the court concluded, Keene's complaint raised serious questions which merited litigation. 92 And, because "every day that the films which [Keene]
wish[ed] to exhibit [bore] the stigma of a characterization as 'political
propaganda' [was] a day when the films [were] unavailable to him as a
medium of communication, thus abridging [Keene's] freedom of
speech," the court concluded Keene had suffered irreparable injury. 93
The Justice Department labelling practice was also challenged in
the federal District Court for the District of Columbia. In that case,
Block v. Smith, the court dismissed the suit, declaring that the plaintiff lacked standing. 94 The court indicated that, unlike the California
85.

Id. at 1515-16.

86.

Id. at 1515.

87.

In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff must demonstrate "either probable success on the

merits plus irreparable injury or the existence of serious questions meriting litigation plus a
significantly heavier burden of hardships." Id. at 1519.
88. Id. at 1523.
89. Id. at 1520.

90. Id
91. Id.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 1522.
583 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984).
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court in Keene v. Smith, it would have held that Senator Keene
lacked standing since the Registration Act did not condition his right
to show foreign films on his compliance with the labelling
requirement. 95
Assuming a distributor who is denied a certificate by the USIA
because his film is not educational, scientific and cultural could establish standing, the case for preliminary relief as stated in Keene v.
Smith could probably also be made out in a challenge to the USIA
procedure. USIA regulations such as section 502.6(b)(3), which provides that the Agency does not certify religious, economic or political
propaganda, or films which espouse a cause, appear indistinguishable
from the provisions of the Registration Act: both concentrate on issues of public policy. And, like the Act, these regulations are "content-sensitive" to the extent that they focus on the subject matter of
films submitted for certification. Thus, a film distributor alleging that
the USIA's certification procedure violates his first amendment rights
could also probably raise serious questions meriting litigation. In addition, a film distributor who is denied a certificate is, presumably,
irreparably injured if he cannot otherwise export his film because of
prohibitively high foreign import duties or if he is delayed in exporting the film as a result of being denied a certificate. Therefore, such a
film distributor might prove he is entitled to preliminary relief in light
of Keene v. Smith. It remains to be seen whether that film distributor
would ultimately prevail on the merits.
1. The potential for restraining expression
Of the benefits derived from issuance of a certificate, exemption
from foreign import duties is apparently the primary reason a film
distributor seeks a certificate. 96 Being denied a certificate is analogous
to being refused tax-exempt status. 97 In theory, it is settled that an
administrative agency cannot deny a valuable benefit, such as tax-exempt status, to persons who engage in certain forms of speech since
the effect of doing so would be to penalize them for that speech. 98 In
practice, this principle remains true except occasionally where invok95. Id. at 1296 n.10 & 1293 n.4.
96. See Rosenberg, supra note 7; Comments of John Mendenhall, supra note 5.
97. One difference between denying a certificate and refusing tax-exempt status is that
unlike tax-exempt status, a certificate does not constitute a government subsidy. As this Comment will discuss, however, this difference appears to make the case against the constitutionality of denying distributors certificates even stronger.
98. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
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ing it would require the government to "subsidize" speech by spending public funds or foregoing tax revenues. 99 The issuance of a
certificate by the USIA, however, does not require the government to
appropriate special funds (beyond the administrative cost of running
the USIA), nor deprive the treasury of revenue (instead, foreign governments honoring the certificates lose money). Therefore, the
USIA's certification program appears to come within the general rule
against government denying valuable benefits on the basis of
speech. 1°° Thus, instances where the USIA has declined to issue a
certificate to a distributor whose film did not meet the criteria set
forth in the USIA's regulations can be compared to cases in which the
Internal Revenue Service has refused to grant tax-exempt status to a
non-profit organization whose first amendment activities made it ineligible under the Internal Revenue Code. Two recent cases in which
the Circuit Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia found this
IRS practice to be unconstitutional support the criticism that the
USIA's procedure might also violate distributors' first amendment
rights.
In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States,'0 the publisher of a
non-profit feminist newspaper, "Big Mama Rag," sought tax-exempt
status afforded to other non-profit organizations whose purposes are
mainly "charitable" or "educational" under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Based upon its determination that the paper's content was not "educational," the IRS denied the application.
Appealing the IRS decision to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, the publisher argued section 501(c)(3) violated
the first amendment by licensing the IRS to discriminate among nonprofit organizations on the basis of speech. 10 2 The court rejected this
argument and upheld the IRS decision, finding that in drafting section
501(c)(3), the Treasury Department had not "intended" to discrimi03
nate on the basis of speech.1
99. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) ("Congress is
not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying" by granting tax-exempt status to
non-profit organizations which engage in lobbying).
100. In addition, courts have held that a person need not be totally barred from disseminating his views before his first amendment rights can be violated. Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F.
Supp. 1328, 1332 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
101. 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
102. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 631
F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 479.
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The court of appeals reversed.104 It considered section 501(c)(3)
to be so vague that it violated the first amendment by allowing the
IRS to deny tax-exempt status in a discriminatory fashion.105 In
reaching this issue, the court noted, "[e]ven though tax exemptions
denial of tax
are a matter of legislative grace. . . , the discriminatory
' 10 6
speech."
free
infringe
exemptions can impermissibly
In another case involving section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, Taxation With Representation v. Regan, 10 7 a non-profit organization formed to promote certain tax interests challenged an IRS
ruling that the organization was not entitled to tax-exempt status because it engaged in substantial lobbying activities. Like the publisher
of "Big Mama Rag," Taxation With Representation argued that section 501(c)(3) violated its first amendment rights by allowing the IRS
to deny organizations tax-exempt status on a discriminatory basis.
Although the court of appeals ultimately held that section 501(c)(3)
violated the equal protection clause, it rejected the first amendment
argument because, in the court's view, it assumed that section
501(c)(1) required the organization to refrain completely from lobbying in order to obtain tax-exempt status.' 0 8 The court noted that, in
reality, Taxation With Representation (unlike the publishers of Big
Mama Rag) could have segregated out its lobbying activites so that its
remaining functions could have qualified the organization for tax-exempt status;1°9 the logical implication of this reasoning being that if
104. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
105. Id at 1035. Specifically, the court found the term "educational" to be excessively
vague. This holding suggests the language of the Beirut Agreement and USIA regulations,
"educational, scientific and cultural," might also be so vague as to violate the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Unlike the Treasury Regulations in which the term "educational" was used, however, the USIA regulations accompanying the term contain specific examples of types of material which do not come within this definition: for example, material
which is intended to inform of timely current events, entertain or propagandize. Consequently,
"educational" is apparently less vague as used by the USIA. See Retired Teachers Legal Fund
v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 280, 283 (1982) ("[r]eading the general statements defining 'educational' together with the. . . subsequent concrete examples which provide objective norms to
illustrate its meaning," the term "educational" is not unconstitutionally vague).
106. 631 F.2d at 1034.
107. 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
108. Id at 726.
109. Id In reversing the court of appeals because it applied a strict scrutiny test to the
equal protection argument, the Supreme Court also addressed the first amendment argument.
It ultimately agreed with the appellate court's disposition of this issue. In doing so, however,
the Court emphatically stressed that no first amendment rights are implicated when Congress
decides to spend funds on one form of speech but not on another. 104 S.Ct. 3262 (1984). As
discussed, because a USIA certificate does not represent a decision by the government to "sub-
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the case had instead involved an organization which could not have
segregated its activities according to the source of its funding, the
IRS's discriminatory denial of tax-exempt status might have violated
the first amendment.110
Both Big Mama Rag and Taxation With Representation involved
the decision of an administrative agency to withhold a tax-saving
benefit from a non-commercial organization because its members had
engaged in certain forms of controversial speech. The courts in both
cases indicated the denial of such a benefit could violate the first
amendment rights of those organizations' members. More specifically, in Taxation With Representation, the court stated that if the
government were to condition its provision of tax benefits on an applicant's willingness to refrain from exercising its first amendment
rights, this would be unconstitutional unless the conditions imposed
were both important and necessary to assure that the legitimate objectives of the benefit program were attained. 11 Since a USIA certificate
entitling a film distributor to be exempt from foreign import duties is
available only if the distributor's film does not entertain, inform of
timely current events, editorialize or propagandize, 1' 2 one might conclude the USIA, analogous to the IRS in Big Mama Rag and Taxation With Representation, has conditioned a certificate on the
willingness of film distributors to refrain from exercising certain first
amendment rights. Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court involving regulations containing criteria identical to the USIA's, however, imply there is no asserted purpose that could justify this
practice.
2.

The insufficiency of asserted government objectives

In Regan v. Time, Inc., 11 3 a magazine publisher challenged the
constitutionality of an amendment to a federal law against counterfeiting. The law had originally banned the use of all photographic
reproductions of currency. Under the amendment, however, the
sidize" one form of speech over another in the same way that a bona fide IRS tax exemption
might, the first amendment remains an issue in analyzing the certification process.
110. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3128 ("in contrast to the appellee
in Taxation With Representation, [a publicly funded radio station] is not able to segregate its
activities according to the source of its funding. . . . [Therefore,] we must reject the Government's contention that our decision in Taxation With Representation is controlling here").
111. 676 F.2d at 726 n.20.
112. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b).
113. 104 S. Ct. 3262 (1984).
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Treasury Department was empowered to allow the reproduction of
currency " 'for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical or
newsworthy purposes .... "114 The district court had declared the
amendment to be an unconstitutional time, place and manner
11 5
regulation.
Hearing a direct appeal, eight members of the Supreme Court
upheld this ruling, noting "[a] determination concerning the newsworthiness or educational value of [some instrument of expression]
cannot help but be based on the content of that [expression] and the
message it delivers." 6 In other words, under a regulation which
calls on the government to make such a determination, one type of
expression will be allowed and another disallowed solely because the
Government determines that the message being conveyed in the one is
newsworthy or educational while the message imparted by the other
is not. Such a regulation is, on its face, unconstitutional. 1 7 Analogous to the amendment at issue in Time, Inc., is the federal legislation
enacting the Beirut Agreement which calls upon the USIA to determine whether a film is "educational, scientific and cultural."' 18 Since
this law requires the USIA to judge the eligibility of films based upon
their content, under Time, Inc., it too would apparently be
unconstitutional.
If, however, one were to assume the USIA's procedure would not
be unconstitutional merely on the basis that it requires the USIA to
make a determination based upon the content of a film, the procedure
might still be invalid because of the nature of the USIA's criteria.
The most controversial of the USIA's practices stems from the
'

Agency's refusal to certify films which "attempt . . . to influence
opinion, conviction or policy. . ., to espouse a cause or conversely,

• . . seem to attack a particular persuasion."' 19 In a recent case involving a similar practice by the Federal Communications Commission, FCCv. League of Women Voters,1 20 the Supreme Court held that
a restriction on the expression of an opinion or a conviction, implicitly tied to a threat to end government funding, is unconstitutional.
In FCC v. League of Women Voters, Pacifica, a non-profit educa114.
115.
116.

104 S. Ct. at 3265.
Time, Inc. v. Regan, 539 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
104 S. Ct. at 3267.

117. Id
118.
119.
120.

Resolution 688, supra note 21.
See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 41.
104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
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tional corporation which operated five radio stations, challenged the
constitutionality of a federal statute which prohibited "editorializing"
by any noncommercial educational broadcast station funded by the
federally created Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Rejecting the
government's asserted interest in ensuring that noncommercial broadcasters do not become propaganda organs for the government, the
Court observed, " 'a regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing
more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view
on controversial issues,' " or discussion of an entire subject matter
" 'is the purest example of a "law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech."'

1121
"

Even assuming that government can legitimately cur-

tail discussion of controversial topics, the Court continued, a ban on
all editorializing is unconstitutional because it is overbroad and based
solely upon the content of suppressed speech.1 22 Accordingly, the
Court held the FCC's ban on editorializing by public broadcasting
stations was an unconstitutionally overbroad and impermissable regulation of speech.123
The USIA's practice of refusing to certify all films which propagandize or espouse a particular cause seems indistinguishable from
the statute at issue in League of Women Voters. Although the
USIA's asserted purpose is to ensure the free flow of accurate information, 24 the USIA refuses to certify all films which propagandize or
espouse a particular cause, regardless of the accuracy of any facts they
may contain. In addition, as the Court in League of Women Voters
implied, a ban on any editorializing may be facially unconstitutional. 25 Accordingly, the USIA's refusal to certify films which
propagandize or espouse a belief appears to be unconstitutional under
League of Women Voters.
3.

The certification procedure as a prior restraint

Aside from the constitutional issues raised by the withholding of
a government benefit based upon the content of speech, the USIA's
procedure for issuing certificates might also be an unconstitutional
prior restraint. Administrative agencies, such as the USIA, are primarily viewed as political organs, rather than impartial decision-mak121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 3120.
Id. at 3119, 3127.
Id. at 3127.
See 22 C.F.R. Part 502 (1984).
104 S. Ct. at 3127.
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ing bodies. 126 Consequently, under the first amendment, an
administrative scheme which imposes a prior restraint on the exhibition of a motion picture must contain certain procedural safeguards
against censorship. 127 First, the administrative agency must carry the
burden of instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the film is
not a form of protected speech. Second, the prior restraint can only
be imposed for a specified period of time in order to preserve the status quo. Third, the scheme must provide for a prompt, final judicial
determination that the decision of the administrative agency was
28
correct. 1
Under the USIA's procedure for issuing certificates, the film distributor, rather than the Agency, has the burden of instituting judicial
proceedings to set aside the USIA's decision to deny him a certificate. 129 In addition, if an applicant is denied a certificate, the denial is
of indefinite duration, rather than temporary and intended merely to
preserve the status quo as required. Finally, although the USIA's procedure provides a means of administrative review, 30 it lacks any provision for a "prompt, final judicial determination" that the USIA's
decision was correct. Thus, it would appear to be an unconstitutional
3
prior restraint.' '

To summarize, although the USIA's refusal to issue a film distributor a certificate does not impose a direct restraint on expression,
such withholding of a government benefit can nonetheless amount to
an unconstitutional infringement of speech. Furthermore, because the
USIA's regulations are "content-sensitive" and, more specifically,
condition the granting of a certificate on a film distributor's willingness to refrain from exporting films which propagandize or editorialize, these regulations impose the kinds of restraints on expression that
the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional. Lastly, because the certification process does not appear to contain the procedural safeguards required of administrative agencies, it appears to impose an
126.

See Monogham, First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARV. L. REv. 518, 522-23

(1970).
127. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
128. Id. at 57-58.
129. Section 502.5 of the USIA's regulations outlines the administrative appellate procedure and establishes that the decision of the Director constitutes final administrative action.
22 C.F.R. § 502.5 (1984).
130. Id. § 502.5(b), (c).
131. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (holding that once a group of
students had filed an application seeking official recognition as a college campus organization,

"the burden shifted to the college to justify its decision of rejection").
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unconstitutional prior restraint on film distributors' rights to send
their films abroad.
C.

Equal Protection Implications

While the witholding of a valuable government benefit, such as a
USIA certificate, can unconstitutionally infringe first amendment
rights, the witholding of a benefit more often runs afoul of equal protection guarantees.1 32 Specifically, the equal protection component of

the due process clause of the fifth amendment bars the federal government from granting a valuable benefit to some individuals yet denying
it to others who are similarly situtated, unless the differing treatment
can be justified.' 33 Thus, along with raising first amendment issues,
the USIA's practice of denying certain films certificates raises the
question of whether, under the equal protection requirement of the
fifth amendment, the USIA's certification procedure is constitutional.
The answer to this latter inquiry is unclear. First, it is uncertain
what level of scrutiny a court would use to determine the equal pro-

tection issue. The fact that the certification procedure affects film distributors' first amendment rights justifies a strict scrutiny standard.' 34
On the other hand, because the issuance of a certificate represents the
USIA's decision to withhold a benefit rather than impose an outright
restriction on a distributor, a court might employ some lower level of
scrutiny.' 35 Likewise, since the certification program is carried out

pursuant to an international treaty, thereby implicating the conduct
of foreign affairs, a court might show greater deference to the party
132. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002-03 (1978). In the first
amendment area, several courts and commentators have noted the overlap between first
amendment and equal protection issues. See, e.g., Taxation With Representation, 676 F.2d at
726 n.23; Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the FirstAmendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 802-03
(1981). Similarly, these issues, although addressed separately in this Comment, are not entirely
distinct.
133. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding government's right to deny
federal funding for certain medically necessary abortions).
134. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 544 ("statutes are subjected to a
higher level of scrutiny if they interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as
freedom of speech").
135. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980). A careful look at the certification program would bear out the important difference
between a USIA certificate and other government benefits; namely, the certificate does not
require Congress to expend funds or forego revenue. Consequently, a lower level of scrutiny
would not be truly justified since no court is faced with the prospect of telling Congress how to
spend public funds.
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asserting the validity of the program and, therefore, employ a lower
level of scrutiny.
In addition, under equal protection analysis, one cannot be certain of the relevant classification, since the USIA's regulatory scheme
creates several conceivable classifications. A broad classification
would be those distributors denied certificates who wish to export
films that are not educational, scientific and cultural, as distinguished
from all other film distributors who wish to export films. This classification presents the more specific question of whether the terms of the
Beirut Agreement itself are consistent with equal protection requirements since the language of the Agreement delineates this class. 136
Alternatively, a more narrow classification would be those distributors whose films are educational, scientific and cultural, yet whose
films also propagandize, entertain or inform of timely current events,
as distinguished from other distributors of educational, scientific and
cultural films. This classification calls into question the USIA's interpretation of the Beirut Agreement and is the more troubling of the
two.

In support of its practice not to certify films which, for example,
propagandize, officials at the USIA have implied that their objective is
to ensure foreign signatories to the Beirut Agreement continue to
honor certificates issued by the United States. 137 Presumably, it is
feared that the USIA will lose credibility if it routinely certifies films
to which receiving countries object. While this purpose might be
served by denying certificates to many types of controversial films, its
legitimacy seems questionable.
First, it contradicts that rule of statutory construction which directs that an instrument should be construed to give effect to its
terms. 38 The Beirut Agreement allows receiving countries to refuse
to accept films under their own censorship laws. 139 In addition, the
Agreement leaves the final decision to honor or not to honor a certificate with receiving nations, as a matter of state sovereignty.14° These
136. Treaties whose terms conflict with the Constitution are technically void rather than
unconstitutional. See Two Hundred and Seven Half Pound Papers of Smoking Tobacco v.
United States, 11 U.S. (Wall.) 616 (1870).
137. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 42-43. Section 502.6(d)(2) of the USIA regulations,
which states that the USIA will not certify "classes of materials which it believes participating
countries would be unwilling to admit free of duty under the terms of the Agreement," reflects
this policy.
138. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (1984).
139. See supra note 9.
140. Id.
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provisions would be redundant if the Beirut Agreement is interpreted
to require a sending country to base its decision to issue a certificate
on the practices of the receiving country, instead of on its own laws.
Second, this objective suggests it is acceptable for the United States
government to engage in unconstitutional conduct as long as it is in
furtherance of the interests of a fellow signatory to a treaty which the
United States has ratified. Such a principle would be novel. These
objections suggest that the USIA's regulatory scheme might also violate equal protection principles by unjustifiably drawing further distinctions among educational, scientific and cultural films.
IV.

A SUGGESTED CHANGE

The suggested shortcomings in the USIA's certification procedure, its content-based criteria and apparent underinclusiveness, stem
from the USIA's view of material that will not be considered educational, scientific and cultural. Consequently, constructive improvements might be achieved by replacing these specific proscriptions with
an objective test, interpreting what "educational, scientific, and cultural" means. Criteria based upon the money-making potential of
films, irrespective of their content, would seem to serve to weed out
small-scale documentary-type films from the money-making blockbuster motion pictures the Beiruit Agreement was intended to
exclude.
For example, perhaps the USIA could certify only films which
their distributors anticipate will generate revenues of, say, $500,000 or
less. If after receiving a certificate and tallying his receipts, a film
distributor makes more, he could then reimburse the importing country for the import duties he would have paid without the certificate.
While such a standard might still fail to include all educational films
which the drafters of the Beirut Agreement sought to protect, it
would at least minimize the content-based decision-making process
required under USIA regulations as they are now written. In addition, such an objective standard would more likely withstand an equal
protection challenge because it would more closely resemble an economic regulation than does the present regulatory scheme.
V.

CONCLUSION

The USIA's administration of the Beirut Agreement raises several legal issues which cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the
certification procedure. First, the USIA has adopted regulations
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which seem inconsistent with the language of the Beirut Agreement
and federal law circumscribing the USIA's authority. Second, in light
of recent Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases, the USIA's certification criteria appear to violate film distributors' first amendment
rights even though the threatened infringement is in the nature of a
benefit withheld rather than a direct restraint imposed. Finally, the
procedure may deny film distributors equal protection under the fifth
amendment since the criteria appear to be underinclusive and also
because the USIA's presumed purpose behind denying certain films
certificates may be illegitimate.
Fortunately, however, these shortcomings largely stem from the
way the USIA administers the Beirut Agreement rather than from the
Agreement itself. Consequently, the program might be improved if
the USIA were to exchange its present regulations for more objective,
content-neutral guidelines. In the meantime, both film distributors
and the USIA run the risk of the certification program being suspended as a result of a court injunction or political pressure, rendering the Beirut Agreement of little use to any American film
distributors, much less exporters of documentary films who need it
most.
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